* fix: respect profile toolset/skill config on WebUI streaming worker (#3294)
The streaming agent runs on a detached worker thread that does not inherit
the per-request thread-local profile context (set from the hermes_profile
cookie on the HTTP handler thread). On that worker, the ambient get_config()
resolves via get_active_profile_name() which falls back to the process-global
_active_profile (usually 'default'). A session under a non-default profile
with an empty platform_toolsets.cli therefore loaded the DEFAULT profile's
full toolset list, inflating a tools-disabled profile's prompt from ~400 to
~15K input tokens.
Add api.config.get_config_for_profile_home() — a race-free direct disk read
of an explicit profile home's config.yaml (no shared-cache mutation), which
defers to get_config() when the requested home matches the ambient path so
in-memory test overrides are preserved. The streaming worker now resolves
_cfg from the session's own profile home, fixing toolsets, prefill context,
and fallback chains in one place.
Closes#3294
Co-authored-by: gottipx <gottipx@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.224 — #3294 profile toolset config (dropped #3405 to hold per Codex stale-model-repair finding)
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: gottipx <gottipx@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat: upgrade MiniMax default model to M3
Add MiniMax-M3 as the new default and prune deprecated older
versions (M2.5/M2.5-highspeed/M2.1/M2) from the model catalog.
M2.7 (and M2.7-highspeed) is retained as the legacy compatible
option for users who pin to it.
Updated:
- api/config.py: _FALLBACK_MODELS adds minimax/MiniMax-M3 (placed
before M2.7 so the dropdown surfaces it first)
- api/config.py: _PROVIDER_MODELS['minimax'] adds M3 first, removes
M2.5/M2.5-highspeed/M2.1
- api/config.py: _PROVIDER_MODELS['minimax-cn'] adds M3 first,
removes M2.5/M2.1/M2
- tests/test_minimax_provider.py: updated CN catalog assertions
to match the new {M3, M2.7} list
API URL and TTS configuration are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Octopus <liyuan851277048@icloud.com>
* fix(models): register openai-api as first-class picker provider
* fix(models): detect OPENAI_API_KEY as openai-api, not bare openai (#3443 Codex follow-up)
Codex review found #3444 added the openai-api picker entry but the env-detection
side still did detected_providers.add('openai') for OPENAI_API_KEY. The agent
registry has only openai-api and openai-codex (no bare openai), so a env-only
OPENAI_API_KEY setup emitted @openai: picker entries the agent can't resolve on
the send path. Detect openai-api to match the registry. Adds a regression test.
* docs(changelog): v0.51.223 — re-stamp keep-set (#3443 openai-api + #3374 MiniMax-M3); dropped #3289 + #3264 to hold per Codex
---------
Co-authored-by: octo-patch <octo-patch@github.com>
Co-authored-by: Octopus <liyuan851277048@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: Rod Boev <rod.boev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
* fix: reject cross-script drifted auto-generated session titles (#3293)
The title-language mismatch guard only knew two states: German (de) or empty,
and _title_language_mismatch early-returned False whenever the user start
wasn't German. So an English conversation whose LLM-generated title came back
in Chinese / Spanish / Russian sailed through and persisted with
llm_title_generated=true. The German case was the only one covered because
that's the one prior report it was built for.
Generalize from a German-specific binary to a language-agnostic cross-script
check. Add _script_counts() + _dominant_script() (cheap, dependency-free
Unicode-block classification: latin / cjk / cyrillic / arabic / hebrew / greek
/ devanagari). _title_language_mismatch now rejects a title that introduces a
substantial amount (>=35% of alphabetic chars, min 2) of a script different
from the conversation start's dominant script — so short titles that embed a
borrowed Latin technical term still trip, while an English title with a single
foreign place-name does not. The legacy German->English same-script heuristic
is preserved verbatim.
Kept api/streaming.py ASCII-only (the test_title_generation_source_has_no_cjk_
literals guard) — all CJK examples live in the test file, not the source.
Closes#3293
Co-authored-by: andrewkangkr <andrewkangkr@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: prune orphaned imported-CLI sidecars from the WebUI sidebar (#3238)
When a CLI/agent session is opened in WebUI it gets a WebUI-owned sidecar
(webui/sessions/<id>.json + _index.json row) so it can render and reopen;
all_sessions() then returns it independently of the agent state.db. If the
user later deletes that session from the CLI / local Hermes storage, nothing
pruned the sidecar — the merge loop only overlays CLI metadata when a matching
state.db row exists and otherwise continues, so the stale row lingered in the
sidebar indefinitely (there is no WebUI delete affordance for CLI rows).
Add api.models.agent_session_row_exists(): an exact, uncapped existence probe
against the state.db sessions table. The sidebar merge loop now drops a row
that is_cli_session_row + not WebUI-native + absent from cli_by_id + whose
state.db row is genuinely gone, and calls prune_session_from_index() so
_index.json self-heals.
The state.db probe is deliberate: get_cli_sessions() caps at
CLI_VISIBLE_SESSION_LIMIT (20), so a still-existing session can fall out of
that window and look deleted — pruning on cli_by_id absence alone would delete
live sessions. WebUI-native rows with a CLI ancestor are never pruned, and any
probe error degrades to keep-the-row so a transient failure can't lose data.
Closes#3238
Co-authored-by: Luxciax <Luxciax@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: count pin quota by visible session lineage
* docs(changelog): v0.51.222 — backend bugfix batch (#3293 title drift, #3238 sidecar prune, #3288 pin lineage)
* fix(pins): forks count as own pin lineage, not collapsed to parent (#3288 Codex follow-up)
Codex review of the batch found a pin-limit UNDERCOUNT: _session_row_lineage_root_id
followed any parent_session_id to the root, but /api/session/branch creates
independent visible fork sessions that also carry parent_session_id (session_source=
'fork'). Two pinned forks of the same parent collapsed to one quota lineage, letting
a user exceed pinned_sessions_limit with no 400. Fix: a fork returns its own id as
its lineage root (it's a separately-visible session); only compression/continuation
rows still collapse to a shared root. Adds a regression test with two pinned forks +
the parent counting as three distinct lineages, and confirms the existing
pre-compression-snapshot collapse case still passes.
* test(pins): update #2508/#2821 source-match tests for #3288 lineage rename
#3288 replaced the raw-session-id pin counter (pinned_ids set) with a
visible-lineage counter (pinned_lineage_ids via _visible_pinned_lineage_ids over
persisted_rows/candidate_rows). Two pre-existing source-string-matching tests
asserted the OLD implementation literals (pinned_ids = {, _session_field(existing,
session_id...), len(pinned_ids) >=). Updated both to assert the new mechanism while
preserving the invariants they actually guard: snapshot computed BEFORE LOCK (no
all_sessions()-inside-LOCK deadlock), quota filtering via the shared
_session_counts_toward_pin_quota helper, and the limit/400 guard. Behaviour
unchanged; these were implementation-detail assertions, not behaviour tests.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: andrewkangkr <andrewkangkr@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Luxciax <Luxciax@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Andy Kang <andrewkang.kr@gmail.com>
* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
Manual title regeneration (POST /api/session/title/regenerate) and background
aux title generation failed with 422 / llm_error_aux when
auxiliary.title_generation.model in config.yaml used the WebUI-internal
@provider:model picker format (e.g. @gemini:gemini-3.1-flash-lite) — the raw
@-qualified id was forwarded to the provider API verbatim. Normalize it through
the canonical _split_webui_provider_model_value() helper before the aux call.
Co-authored-by: pamnard <pamnard@users.noreply.github.com>
v0.51.218 fixed getModelLabel() (the visible chip) for URI-scheme model IDs but
left the same first-segment-slash-strip bug in the matching/dedup paths:
api/config.py _norm_model_id + _get_label_for_model, and static/ui.js
_normalizeConfiguredModelKey. For gpt://folder/model/latest those treat the
path slashes as provider delimiters, mis-normalizing the model-identity key
(the #3360 collision class, for URI ids). Adds a URI-scheme guard to all three
so the scheme is not stripped. Kept v0.51.218's getModelLabel (more thorough
than #3436's variant — it extracts the model name vs returning the whole id);
took #3436's backend + _normalizeConfiguredModelKey halves with backend/frontend
parity tests.
Co-authored-by: b3nw <b3nw@duck.com>
#3324 moved the WebUI session/delivery context from a prefill user message into
_webui_ephemeral_system_prompt, but the gateway-backed WebUI chat path built its
own system message from the bare _WEBUI_PROGRESS_PROMPT + prefill helper — which
now returns only recall prefill. That silently dropped connected platforms, home
channels, delivery hints, and session framing on Gateway-routed WebUI chats
(same #3278 data-drop class, on the path the author missed). Build the gateway
request's system message with _webui_ephemeral_system_prompt(surface_context,
config_data=cfg) so the context is preserved. Regression test asserts the
delivery context is present in the gateway system message.
Consecutive user turns (session-context prefill + actual message) made models
with strict chat templates (Mistral, Gemma via llama.cpp) reject the request
with a Jinja 500. Move the platform/delivery context (connected platforms, home
channels, scheduled-task delivery hints) from _webui_session_context_message
(a prefill user message) into _webui_delivery_context_prompt, appended to the
ephemeral system prompt. Session framing stays in _webui_surface_context_prompt.
Context is preserved — just role-alternation-safe. Closes#3276.
Co-authored-by: aether-agent <aether-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds _session_message_dedup_key (full-precision timestamp) so true duplicates
(same role + content + EXACT timestamp) fold, while legitimately-repeated
identical turns with sub-second-distinct timestamps survive — avoiding the
#3268 data-loss class. Wired into both the no-sidecar path and the merge loop's
seen_dedup_keys guard. Closes#3346.
Co-authored-by: thanhtoantnt <thanhtoantnt@users.noreply.github.com>
_merge_display_messages_after_agent_result shared one _emitted set between
context-backfill rows and the visible-display backbone; _message_identity
ignores timestamps, so a second identical visible user turn was suppressed as
already-emitted. Now the display backbone is always appended in order; a
separate _context_inserted set + the _display_id_set guard dedupe only the
spliced-in context rows. Adds a regression test with two identical visible
user turns + a context-only gap.
Backfill model-context turns into the visible transcript before saving the
latest reply while keeping hidden [context compaction] markers out of the
visible transcript, so sidebar/header message counts no longer collapse a
compacted gateway session to a 2-message conversation. Resolves the
transcript-loss regression the v0.51.197 Codex gate flagged on the original.
Co-authored-by: AJV20 <24819659+AJV20@users.noreply.github.com>
You were right — the original analysis was inverted. The unprefixed
form (sys.argv only) is the correct fix for frozen/packaged builds
(PyInstaller, zipapp, etc.) where sys.argv[0] == sys.executable ==
<binary>; master's [sys.executable] + sys.argv form re-inserts the
binary as argv[1] in that case, which the interpreter then tries to
parse as the script to run — leading to a recursive-reexec that
never reaches bind().
But for a source checkout launched as `python server.py` via
bootstrap.py / ctl.sh / start.sh, sys.argv[0] is the SCRIPT path and
sys.executable is the interpreter. CPython treats argv[1] as the
script to run, so we must pass [sys.executable] + sys.argv — the
canonical CPython re-exec idiom.
The two cases are mutually exclusive on argv shape, so a flat swap
can't be right for both. Distinguish with sys.frozen (set by
PyInstaller / zipapp / similar) and pick the right form per case.
Also reworded the last-resort except comment — the prior
"(e.g. frozen binary)" parenthetical was misleading; this branch is
the unconditional fallback for any execv failure, not specifically
the frozen case.
Follow-up to PR #3382 review feedback. There are three GitHub-related
env vars that can be auto-detected:
- COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN: user-specific config, should NOT be filtered
- GITHUB_TOKEN: classic PAT, should be filtered (already done)
- GH_TOKEN: another env var, should also be filtered (this commit)
Use a frozenset (_AMBIENT_GH_ENV_SOURCES) to clearly define which
env var sources are ambient vs user-configured.
Copilot API does not support classic PATs (ghp_*), only OAuth tokens (gho_*)
or fine-grained PATs (github_pat_*). When GITHUB_TOKEN env var contains a
classic PAT, it should be filtered from the credential pool to prevent
Copilot from appearing in the model picker dropdown.
The _is_ambient_gh_cli_entry() function now also filters entries with
source='env:GITHUB_TOKEN', treating them as ambient/auto-detected rather
than user-explicitly-added credentials.
Fixes issue where Copilot group appeared in WebUI model picker even when
gh auth token was an unsupported classic PAT.
When a custom/proxy provider serves models whose IDs share the same base
name across vendor prefixes (e.g. vendor_a/deepseek/deepseek-v4-pro vs
vendor_b/deepseek/deepseek-v4-pro), several normalization functions use
split('/').pop() (or split('/')[-1]) which discards all segments except
the last. This causes three user-facing symptoms: (1) clicking one
model selects a different colliding model, (2) configured-model badges
attach to the wrong dropdown entry, and (3) the model-chip label in the
composer bar is truncated to just the base model name.
Root cause: all three callers take only the last slash-segment instead
of stripping only the first (provider) segment and preserving the
remaining vendor hierarchy.
Fix 1 — _findModelInDropdown (static/ui.js): Move the exact string match
before the provider-aware normalized match. Previously, when all models
share the same provider ID (common with LLM proxy setups), the normalized
match returned whichever colliding option appeared first in DOM order,
even though an exact match existed.
Fix 2 — _normalizeConfiguredModelKey (static/ui.js) and _norm_model_id
(api/config.py): Replace split('/').pop() / split('/')[-1] with a first-
segment-only strip (regex on frontend, split('/',1) on backend), matching
the strategy already used by _findModelInDropdown's norm lambda. This
prevents multi-slash IDs from colliding in badge assignment and the
configured-entry dedup set. Additionally, strip colon-qualified provider
prefixes (e.g. custom:name/) before the slash strip so badge-key variants
like 'custom:llm-proxy/opencode_go/model' merge correctly with the bare
'opencode_go/model' in the configured section dedup.
Fix 3 — getModelLabel (static/ui.js) and _get_label_for_model
(api/config.py): Same split('/').pop() to first-segment-strip change so
the composer-bar model chip and backend label preserve vendor context
(e.g. shows 'opencode_go/deepseek-v4-pro' instead of 'deepseek-v4-pro').
Verification: 9 new regression tests (test_issue3360) covering exact-
match priority, multi-slash normalization, and backend/frontend parity.
Updated 1 existing test (test_norm_model_id_trailing_empty_guard) that
asserted the old split('/').pop() pattern. All 25 related tests pass.
AI Usage: Gemini (gemini-2.5-pro), via Antigravity IDE, pair-programmed.
(cherry picked from commit a454fecd2b3a83f7da34473c883be069171aeac9)
Nathan screenshot feedback on the Plugins card:
- Open button rendered as a yellow block with INVISIBLE text: --accent-text
resolves to the same gold as --accent in the default theme (text==bg). Switched
to a ghost/outline button (accent text + border on the card surface; fills on
hover) — always legible regardless of theme.
- Removed the redundant DOUBLE 'Enabled' badge (the dashboard-specific badge
duplicated the generic activation badge; kept the generic one).
- Toggle slider knob was hard to see on the gold 'on' state; added a drop shadow.
Also Opus SHOULD-FIX: _VALID_PLUGIN_TAB_PATH now rejects a leading '//'
(protocol-relative URL → remote origin in iframe.src). Test updated.
Codex CORE (verified live): _PLUGIN_STATIC_ROOTS points at dashboard/ and
serve_plugin_static() served ANY file beneath it — so /dashboard-plugins/<name>/
plugin_api.py leaked plugin backend SOURCE, and manifest.json / .env were
reachable too. Now constrained: served path must be under dist/ or static/, no
dotfiles in any path segment, and a static-extension allowlist (refuses .py/.json/
.env/.toml/.sh etc.). Verified: plugin_api.py, manifest.json, dist/.env,
dist/config.py all 404; dist/app.js still serves. Regression test added.
Codex found two more once the config-guard bug was fixed (Opus concurred on #2):
1. panels.js _buildPluginCard built the Open button + enable toggle with inline
onclick/onchange that interpolated tab.path / plugin.key into a JS-string-in-
attribute context — HTML-escaping is insufficient there (quote breakout).
Now rendered inert + bound via addEventListener with RAW closure values.
2. tab.path was unvalidated. Added _VALID_PLUGIN_TAB_PATH (^/[A-Za-z0-9._~/-]{0,255}$)
in load_plugins() — absolute, no quotes/query/fragment/control chars.
Also Opus nit: deep-merge now coerces dashboard_plugins values to bool + str keys.
Regression tests added for both.
CRITICAL (Opus HALT on prior commit): the PR's edit to save_settings() replaced
'if k in _SETTINGS_ALLOWED_KEYS' with 'if k=="dashboard_plugins": continue' and
orphaned the whole validation body under the continue. Effects: (a) settings save
broken for every key except dashboard_plugins; (b) the allowlist security boundary
gone -> any client key (password_hash, signing_key_*) became settable. Restored the
guard + correct indentation; dashboard_plugins handled by the deep-merge above.
Verified in-process: language persists, password_hash/signing_key injection
rejected, dashboard_plugins still deep-merges.
Also (Opus SHOULD-FIX #3): validate plugin name against ^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$
so a manifest name like '../foo' can't make the URL-space ambiguous.
Regression tests added for both (the allowlist bug had ZERO coverage).
Deep-review (Opus MUST-FIX + Codex kick-back) findings, all confirmed with repros:
1. Same-origin XSS via direct nav to a plugin's raw .html/.svg asset: the
/dashboard-plugins/<name>/ route served plugin-controlled HTML with text/html
at the WebUI origin and NO sandbox header (only the in-panel iframe + the
page route were sandboxed). Verified: <script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
in a plugin html ran same-origin. Fix: send 'Content-Security-Policy: sandbox
allow-scripts allow-forms allow-popups' + 'X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff'
on the asset response (null-origin, same as the page route).
2. 'Disabled' was UI-only: toggling a plugin off just hid the Open button; its
page + asset URLs kept serving. Fix: new _dashboard_plugin_enabled() gates
BOTH the asset route and the page route server-side (opt-in, default off,
disabled => 404).
3. i18n: panels.js referenced t('plugins_enable_toggle') but the PR defined a
mismatched English-only 'settings_plugins_enable_toggle' (dead key) — toggle
label fell back to literal AND tripped the locale-parity gate. Renamed to
plugins_enable_toggle and added to all 12 locales (zh-Hant gets Traditional
啟用, not Simplified).
- Remove unused imports (importlib, sys in api/plugins.py; pytest in test).
- Two tests asserted 'X or True' (always pass — meaningless). Rewrote them to
actually verify the /plugins/ route allowlists plugin.css + uses relative_to
traversal guard, and that manifest fields are html.escape()'d before IIFE-shell
interpolation. Dropped a dead 'original_plugins' local for a real dict assertion.
- The is_relative_to() check already covers the workspace==target equality case
(is_relative_to(A,A) is True), so the '!= workspace' prefix was redundant.
- Symlink test now asserts a hard 403 (proves the guard fires, not just that
nothing leaked) and cleans up the out-of-workspace escape dir in a finally.
test_sprint1's parse_multipart tests exec() the function's source in an isolated
namespace with only re/email.parser imported; referencing the MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES
module global there NameErrored. Import it locally inside the function (with a
defensive fallback) so the function is self-contained and the isolated-exec
tests pass.
Codex regression-gate findings on the shipped #3104 upload code, each verified
with a repro and fixed:
1. Negative Content-Length bypassed the size cap → unbounded rfile.read(-1).
The per-handler 'content_length > MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES' check is False for a
negative value, so the guard is now centralized in parse_multipart()
(validates [0, MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES]) — protects all four upload handlers.
2. .tar/.tbz2/.txz uploads silently skipped extraction (is_archive suffix set
was narrower than extract_archive's) → now matches.
3. Rejected archives (zip-slip/zip-bomb/corrupt/too-many-members) showed a
misleading 'Uploaded' success toast → workspace.js now surfaces extract_error.
4. An in-workspace symlink subpath let mkdir/writes escape the workspace root →
target_dir is now required to be is_relative_to(workspace) before mkdir.
Regression tests added (negative+oversize CL, .tar extraction, symlink target).
Maintainer review changes on the Edge TTS PR:
- edge-tts was added as a HARD base requirement, but the /api/tts handler is
designed optional (ImportError returns 503). Moved it out of requirements.txt
with an OPTIONAL comment + install hint; updated the 503 message from the
nonexistent 'see docs' to the actual install command. Keeps minimal base deps.
- PR shipped NO tests for a new auth+rate-limited+allowlisted network endpoint.
Added tests/test_issue2931_edge_tts_endpoint.py covering method (405), missing
text (400), over-length (400), voice allowlist (400), per-client rate limit
(429) — all in-process, no real synthesis/network.
Opus review SHOULD-FIX on the upload surface:
- Add _MAX_ARCHIVE_MEMBERS=10000 cap in extract_archive (both zip + tar loops):
a tiny archive with millions of members slips under the byte cap but can
exhaust inodes/fds. Trips before extraction, cleaned up via the existing
rmtree-on-exception. Regression test added.
- Bound the extraction-dir collision-suffix loop (was while-True) to 1000 tries.
Other Opus SHOULD-FIX items (member-count #1 done; #2 done) filed as follow-up
or N/A: same-field multi-file collapse doesn't apply (frontend sends one request
per file); .tar.gz stem cosmetic.
Two issues caught by the PR's own tests against the out-of-process test server:
1. Dedup reporting bug: after a filename collision the file was correctly
written to e.g. report-1.pdf, but the JSON response reported the ORIGINAL
name (safe_name) — now reports dest.name. (Real user-facing bug.)
2. Zip-bomb cap was untestable: the test monkeypatched _MAX_EXTRACTED_BYTES in
the pytest process, which has no effect on the separate server process where
extraction runs. Made the cap env-configurable (HERMES_WEBUI_MAX_EXTRACTED_MB,
read at call time via _max_extracted_bytes(); defaults to 10x upload cap),
set it to 5MB in the conftest server env, and rewrote the test to upload a
compressible archive that genuinely extracts past the cap. Also asserts no
partial extraction dir is left behind.
Plus lint: unused field_name loop var -> _field_name, unused os import in test.
Closes#3106. Adds /api/session/title/regenerate endpoint + session-action
menu item. Preserves chronology (touch_updated_at=False), guards read-only
and imported sessions, syncs to state.db when Insights sync enabled.
Maintainer refinement (Opus SHOULD-FIX): scope the is_imported guard to the
regenerate action only instead of broadening the shared _isReadOnlySession()
helper, which also gates rename/pin/archive/move/fork. Matches the backend
403 guard. Test updated to assert the scoped shape.
Codex+Opus gate findings on the profile-scoping PR:
1. panels.js: retag S.session.profile on ANY profile switch (was inside the
if(data.default_model) block, so model-less profile switches left a stale chip).
2. sessions.js: project-picker filter now mirrors the server's root-alias
tolerance (default <-> renamed-root) so a server-approved 'default' project
isn't hidden for a renamed-root session.
3. routes.py /api/projects/create: validate the optional client-supplied profile
via _PROFILE_ID_RE before stamping (was trusting raw client input -> could
create hidden cross-profile rows). Updated the PR's string-assertion test.
Codex regression-gate finding: since Session.save() no longer auto-clears the
truncation_watermark, the unconditional 'timestamp > watermark' skip in
merge_session_messages_append_only became a permanent ceiling — a genuine future
state.db-only row (recovery/compaction, missed by the sidecar) would be silently
dropped from /api/session and model-context reconstruction forever. Only apply the
above-watermark skip while the sidecar has NOT advanced past the watermark. Preserves
the #2914 deleted-tail filtering (revert-verified). Adds 2 regression tests.
Fixes type annotations where non-optional types (str, int) are used with
None defaults. All affected parameters now use Optional[T] = None.
Closes#3322
Prior round stripped provider prefixes from both sides and matched bare-only,
which over-matched: openai/gpt-4o would match default openrouter/gpt-4o. Now the
matcher compares bare model ids AND rejects when both sides identify DIFFERENT
providers (from provider/ prefix, @provider: qualifier, or the explicit provider
arg). Same-provider / unknown-session-provider still match. Added cross-provider
rejection regression tests.
Co-authored-by: allenliang2022 <allenliang2022@users.noreply.github.com>
