* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
7c48c37629