getCurrentUser() only decoded the pb_auth cookie locally and trusted its
embedded role/client/active fields directly — the PocketBase JS SDK holds
no secret to check a JWT signature against, so a completely forged cookie
(garbage signature, role: "owner", any email) was accepted as a real
session. Verified exploitable end-to-end: a raw Cookie header against the
live app, no browser and no password, rendered the owner's home page.
This mattered most for actions writing through the superuser connection
(log-work.ts, summarise.ts, ingest.ts, and critically users.ts for account
creation) — those never route the caller's token through PocketBase's own
rule engine at all, so the app-level role check was the ONLY gate, and it
was reading an unverified claim. Actions using the caller's own token
(cards.ts, projects.ts) still made the wrong authorization DECISION from
the forged role, even though PocketBase's rule engine would have rejected
the actual data write.
Fixed by having getCurrentUser() call authRefresh(), which asks PocketBase
to confirm the token is genuine; a forged or tampered token is refused
there and treated as signed-out. Wrapped in React's cache() so the extra
round-trip happens once per request, not once per call site (several pages
call this more than once). Re-fetching the live record also means a
deactivated account (`active: false`) stops working on its very next
request instead of only being blocked at a new login.
Regression test builds the exact forged cookie used to verify this,
confirmed red against the vulnerable code and green against the fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
