The users collection kept PocketBase's defaults because the Plan 1a rules
migration covered eight collections and missed this one:
createRule "" -> anyone could sign up
updateRule "id = @request.auth.id" -> anyone could edit their own record
`role` is an ordinary field here, so both were escalations. Verified
exploitable against the live instance: an anonymous request created an
account with role "owner", and a client manager promoted themselves to
owner by patching their own record. Either route yields read and write
access to every client's board.
Create, update and delete are now superuser-only; list and view are
owner-or-self. Adds four integration tests so a regression fails loudly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
There is one PocketBase instance and it is hosted. Removes the `npm run pb`
script, which started a local server nothing used.
The schema had two apparent sources of truth. scripts/setup-remote.ts is the
one that actually runs; pb_migrations/ only executes on PocketBase server
start, which never happens here. Both now say so, so nobody edits a migration
and believes the schema changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- migrations/ documented in pocketbase/pb_migrations/ for local PB
- scripts/setup-remote.ts applies them via admin API to remote PB
- collections: clients, projects, columns, cards, subtasks, comments, activity, settings
- user extension: role (owner|client_manager), client (relation)
- writes: owner only for app collections, superuser-only for activity and settings
