Commit graph

5 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
b3aac9ba4f feat(plan): Plan Puzzle v1 backend — proposal fields, server actions, Done-column guards
Adds the three proposal fields (proposed_target_date, proposed_by,
proposed_at) to the cards collection with a partial index that backs
the 'pending proposals' query, plus two new ActivityAction values
(date_proposed, date_proposal_resolved) and column_changed for
return-to-scheduled.

New server actions under src/app/actions/:
  - client-proposal.ts: client-manager drag creates a proposal (not
    a target_date write); 404 (not 403) on cross-tenant failures and
    Done-column cards, matching the rest of /api/client/*.
  - owner-plan.ts: accept and dismiss clear the three proposal
    fields together and emit the audit rows; returnToScheduledAction
    moves a Done card back to the first working column.

Server-side Done-column guards added to:
  - src/app/actions/reschedule.ts (was UI-only)
  - src/app/api/client/cards/[id]/route.ts (was UI-only)

Both pass through the new writeCardWithAudit helper at
src/lib/cards/write-with-audit.ts — single source of truth for
'patch card + emit activity rows', replacing the inline copies in
the PATCH route and rescheduleCardAction.

Adds src/lib/roadmap/slot-date.ts (slot <-> target_date mapping)
consumed by Pixel's puzzle UI; named SlotId API rather than the
plan's numeric indices for self-documenting callers.

CLIENT_EDITABLE_CARD_FIELDS stays at priority + target_date per
the brief; proposals go through the dedicated action so they get
their own audit row type.
2026-09-19 18:35:33 +02:00
287d70c42c feat(users): active flag, backfilled, enforced at sign-in 2026-09-16 11:26:16 +02:00
2a8d6f2505 fix(security): lock the users collection against privilege escalation
The users collection kept PocketBase's defaults because the Plan 1a rules
migration covered eight collections and missed this one:

  createRule ""                      -> anyone could sign up
  updateRule "id = @request.auth.id"  -> anyone could edit their own record

`role` is an ordinary field here, so both were escalations. Verified
exploitable against the live instance: an anonymous request created an
account with role "owner", and a client manager promoted themselves to
owner by patching their own record. Either route yields read and write
access to every client's board.

Create, update and delete are now superuser-only; list and view are
owner-or-self. Adds four integration tests so a regression fails loudly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 11:18:13 +02:00
95346c5c82 docs: Coolify-only setup, and mark pb_migrations as non-executing
There is one PocketBase instance and it is hosted. Removes the `npm run pb`
script, which started a local server nothing used.

The schema had two apparent sources of truth. scripts/setup-remote.ts is the
one that actually runs; pb_migrations/ only executes on PocketBase server
start, which never happens here. Both now say so, so nobody edits a migration
and believes the schema changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 10:32:26 +02:00
ba990f0109 feat(schema): all collections + role-scoped API rules on remote PB
- migrations/ documented in pocketbase/pb_migrations/ for local PB
- scripts/setup-remote.ts applies them via admin API to remote PB
- collections: clients, projects, columns, cards, subtasks, comments, activity, settings
- user extension: role (owner|client_manager), client (relation)
- writes: owner only for app collections, superuser-only for activity and settings
2026-09-16 09:41:20 +02:00