Commit graph

3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
287d70c42c feat(users): active flag, backfilled, enforced at sign-in 2026-09-16 11:26:16 +02:00
2a8d6f2505 fix(security): lock the users collection against privilege escalation
The users collection kept PocketBase's defaults because the Plan 1a rules
migration covered eight collections and missed this one:

  createRule ""                      -> anyone could sign up
  updateRule "id = @request.auth.id"  -> anyone could edit their own record

`role` is an ordinary field here, so both were escalations. Verified
exploitable against the live instance: an anonymous request created an
account with role "owner", and a client manager promoted themselves to
owner by patching their own record. Either route yields read and write
access to every client's board.

Create, update and delete are now superuser-only; list and view are
owner-or-self. Adds four integration tests so a regression fails loudly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 11:18:13 +02:00
ba990f0109 feat(schema): all collections + role-scoped API rules on remote PB
- migrations/ documented in pocketbase/pb_migrations/ for local PB
- scripts/setup-remote.ts applies them via admin API to remote PB
- collections: clients, projects, columns, cards, subtasks, comments, activity, settings
- user extension: role (owner|client_manager), client (relation)
- writes: owner only for app collections, superuser-only for activity and settings
2026-09-16 09:41:20 +02:00