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7 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
nesquena-hermes
9c6a96f483
Release v0.51.274 — Release IP (stage-p3c — symlink-swap TOCTOU hardening #3630) (#3680)
* fix(security): harden routes file APIs against symlink swaps (#3630, #3450)

Co-authored-by: Rod Boev <rod.boev@gmail.com>

* docs(changelog): v0.51.274 — Release IP (stage-p3c)

---------

Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Rod Boev <rod.boev@gmail.com>
2026-06-05 12:58:11 -07:00
nesquena-hermes
ce7a2c14db fix(security #3234): enumerate named-profile roots, drop wholesale profiles deny (Codex review #8)
Denying the whole <root>/profiles tree 403'd legitimate named-profile workspace
media (<base>/profiles/p1/workspace/shot.png). Fix: remove 'profiles' from
_DENY_SUBDIRS and instead enumerate each <root>/profiles/<name> directory as its
own Hermes root — so each profile's sensitive subdirs (sessions/memories/cron/
logs/checkpoints/backups) + secret filenames are denied, while that profile's
workspace/ is allowed via the carve-out. Adds a regression test: named-profile
workspace media serves, profile + sibling-profile auth.json stay 403.
2026-05-31 03:48:59 +00:00
nesquena-hermes
26305c2ebb fix(security #3234): gate active-workspace carve-out against broad/internal roots (Codex review #4)
Codex round-4: the carve-out could re-open the hole if the active workspace is
pathologically set to a broad/internal root ($HOME, ~/.hermes, a profile root)
— get_last_workspace only checks is_dir(), so workspace=~/.hermes would serve
state.db. Gate the carve-out: disable it when the active workspace IS, CONTAINS,
or is CONTAINED BY any Hermes root, or is $HOME / a */profiles dir / a named
profile root / an internal state subdir. Adds a unit test proving state.db stays
403 when the active workspace is the Hermes home. Widen CSP-slice test window.
2026-05-31 03:08:10 +00:00
nesquena-hermes
c514b32f61 fix(security #3234): cover ALL Hermes roots in /api/media deny-list (Codex review #2)
Under a named profile, process HERMES_HOME is ~/.hermes/profiles/<name> but the
allowlist still grants base ~/.hermes — so the prior deny (anchored only on the
active-profile root + STATE_DIR) left ~/.hermes/state.db and sibling-profile
secrets (~/.hermes/profiles/other/auth.json) reachable. Build deny roots from
every Hermes state root the allowlist accepts: active HERMES_HOME, base ~/.hermes,
api.profiles._DEFAULT_HERMES_HOME, and STATE_DIR; apply the state-subdir dir-denies
under each. Widen the CSP-slice structural test window to match.
2026-05-31 02:45:17 +00:00
nesquena-hermes
c36fda23f7 test: widen _handle_media CSP-slice window to 7000 after #3234 deny-list insertion 2026-05-31 02:32:16 +00:00
nesquena-hermes
8c803c0a07 fix(tests): clear two test failures (one pre-existing, one bumped by #2044)
1. test_issue1362_codex_oauth_onboarding.py::test_anthropic_onboarding_setup_allows_linked_oauth_without_api_key
   Pre-existing env-collision bug, surfaced when HERMES_WEBUI_SKIP_ONBOARDING=1
   is in the test runner env (set by hosting providers and by isolated test
   harnesses). `apply_onboarding_setup()` short-circuits without writing the
   config file when SKIP_ONBOARDING is set, but the test asserts the file was
   written, so it fails with FileNotFoundError on read_text().
   Fix: `monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_SKIP_ONBOARDING", raising=False)` —
   matches the convention already used in test_issue1499_keyless_onboarding.py
   and test_issue1500_lmstudio_env_var_alignment.py.

2. test_issue1800_file_html_interactions.py::test_media_html_inline_keeps_csp_sandbox
   Slicing-based source-string assertion (4000-char window after `def _handle_media`)
   broke because PR #2044's MEDIA_ALLOWED_ROOTS parsing was inserted earlier in
   the function and pushed the CSP block to offset 4211. Widened window to 5000.
   Assertion content is structural (CSP sandbox string present), not positional.
2026-05-11 02:55:50 +00:00
Frank Song
8bc2677691 fix: repair file picker and html preview interactions 2026-05-07 16:59:00 +00:00