fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
"""
|
|
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|
Tests for symlink cycle detection in workspace file browser.
|
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When a workspace contains symlinks (especially to directories outside the
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workspace root), the directory listing must terminate without infinite
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recursion. Covers:
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- External symlink dirs (e.g. ln -s /some/path ~/workspace/link)
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- Self-referencing symlink (ln -s . ~/workspace/loop)
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- Ancestor symlink (ln -s .. ~/workspace/up)
|
Release v0.51.221 — Release GO (stage-p3e — block all workspace symlink escapes + portable TOCTOU hardening [security]) (#3398) (#3451)
* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 23:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
- Internal symlink entries carry correct type / is_dir / target fields
|
2026-06-21 08:55:34 +00:00
|
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|
- External symlink directories are emitted as display-only rows (target_outside_workspace=True)
|
|
|
|
|
and cannot be traversed
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
import json
|
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|
|
|
import os
|
|
|
|
|
import pathlib
|
2026-06-22 04:18:39 +00:00
|
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|
import urllib.parse
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
import urllib.request
|
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|
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import urllib.error
|
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|
|
import tempfile
|
2026-06-23 06:52:44 +00:00
|
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import pytest
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
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from tests._pytest_port import BASE
|
2026-06-23 06:52:44 +00:00
|
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import api.workspace as w
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
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def get(path):
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url = BASE + path
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|
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=10) as r:
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return json.loads(r.read())
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def post(path, body=None):
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url = BASE + path
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data = json.dumps(body or {}).encode()
|
2026-06-22 04:18:39 +00:00
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|
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"}
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|
if path == "/api/escape/authorize":
|
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|
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(BASE)
|
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headers["Origin"] = f"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}"
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data,
|
2026-06-22 04:18:39 +00:00
|
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|
headers=headers)
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
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try:
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with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as r:
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return json.loads(r.read()), r.status
|
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except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
|
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return json.loads(e.read()), e.code
|
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def make_session(created_list, ws=None):
|
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body = {}
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if ws:
|
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# tmp_path_factory creates dirs under /var/folders or /tmp which sit
|
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# outside the user home tree, so they aren't trusted by default.
|
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# Register the workspace first via the explicit add API (intent-trusted)
|
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# before requesting a session against it.
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post("/api/workspaces/add", {"path": str(ws)})
|
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body["workspace"] = str(ws)
|
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d, _ = post("/api/session/new", body)
|
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sid = d["session"]["session_id"]
|
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created_list.append(sid)
|
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return sid, pathlib.Path(d["session"]["workspace"])
|
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class TestSymlinkCycleDetection:
|
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"""Symlink cycle detection in list_dir / safe_resolve_ws."""
|
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|
2026-06-21 08:55:34 +00:00
|
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def test_external_symlink_emitted_as_display_only(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
|
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|
"""External symlink dirs are emitted with target_outside_workspace=True (display-only)."""
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
ws = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("ws")
|
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|
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|
target = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("target")
|
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|
(target / "file.txt").write_text("hello")
|
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|
link = ws / "ext"
|
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link.symlink_to(target)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Release v0.51.221 — Release GO (stage-p3e — block all workspace symlink escapes + portable TOCTOU hardening [security]) (#3398) (#3451)
* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 23:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
sid, _ = make_session(cleanup_test_sessions, ws)
|
|
|
|
|
listing = get(f"/api/list?session_id={sid}&path=.")
|
2026-06-21 08:55:34 +00:00
|
|
|
entries = {e["name"]: e for e in listing["entries"]}
|
|
|
|
|
assert "ext" in entries
|
|
|
|
|
assert entries["ext"]["type"] == "symlink"
|
|
|
|
|
assert entries["ext"]["target_outside_workspace"] is True
|
2026-06-21 09:11:57 +00:00
|
|
|
# #4581 hardening: display-only escape rows don't disclose target-derived
|
|
|
|
|
# metadata (is_dir/target), so an external dir symlink reports is_dir=False.
|
|
|
|
|
assert entries["ext"]["is_dir"] is False
|
|
|
|
|
assert "target" not in entries["ext"]
|
Release v0.51.221 — Release GO (stage-p3e — block all workspace symlink escapes + portable TOCTOU hardening [security]) (#3398) (#3451)
* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 23:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_internal_symlink_listed_as_symlink(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Internal symlink dirs should appear with type='symlink', is_dir=True."""
|
2026-06-23 06:52:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if not w._DIR_FD_OK:
|
|
|
|
|
pytest.skip("internal symlink listing is platform-dependent without dir_fd")
|
Release v0.51.221 — Release GO (stage-p3e — block all workspace symlink escapes + portable TOCTOU hardening [security]) (#3398) (#3451)
* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 23:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
ws = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("ws")
|
|
|
|
|
target = ws / "target"
|
|
|
|
|
target.mkdir()
|
|
|
|
|
(target / "file.txt").write_text("hello")
|
|
|
|
|
link = ws / "internal"
|
|
|
|
|
link.symlink_to(target)
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
sid, _ = make_session(cleanup_test_sessions, ws)
|
|
|
|
|
listing = get(f"/api/list?session_id={sid}&path=.")
|
|
|
|
|
entries = listing["entries"]
|
Release v0.51.221 — Release GO (stage-p3e — block all workspace symlink escapes + portable TOCTOU hardening [security]) (#3398) (#3451)
* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 23:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
internal = [e for e in entries if e["name"] == "internal"]
|
|
|
|
|
assert len(internal) == 1
|
|
|
|
|
assert internal[0]["type"] == "symlink"
|
|
|
|
|
assert internal[0]["is_dir"] is True
|
|
|
|
|
assert internal[0]["target"] == str(target)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_external_symlink_not_browsable(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Listing inside an external symlink dir is blocked at the workspace boundary."""
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
ws = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("ws")
|
|
|
|
|
target = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("target")
|
|
|
|
|
(target / "inner.txt").write_text("data")
|
|
|
|
|
(ws / "ext").symlink_to(target)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sid, _ = make_session(cleanup_test_sessions, ws)
|
Release v0.51.221 — Release GO (stage-p3e — block all workspace symlink escapes + portable TOCTOU hardening [security]) (#3398) (#3451)
* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 23:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
get(f"/api/list?session_id={sid}&path=ext")
|
|
|
|
|
assert False, "External symlink traversal should be blocked"
|
|
|
|
|
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
|
|
|
|
|
assert e.code in (400, 404, 500)
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2026-06-23 06:52:44 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_escape_authorized_listing_virtualizes_paths(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
|
|
|
|
|
ws = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("ws")
|
|
|
|
|
target = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("target")
|
|
|
|
|
(target / "child.txt").write_text("data", encoding="utf-8")
|
|
|
|
|
(ws / "ext").symlink_to(target)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sid, _ = make_session(cleanup_test_sessions, ws)
|
|
|
|
|
auth, status = post("/api/escape/authorize", {"session_id": sid, "path": "ext"})
|
|
|
|
|
assert status == 200, auth
|
|
|
|
|
listed = get(f"/api/escape/list?session_id={sid}&token={auth['token']}&path=ext")
|
|
|
|
|
entries = {entry["name"]: entry for entry in listed["entries"]}
|
|
|
|
|
assert listed["path"] == "ext"
|
|
|
|
|
assert listed["read_only"] is True
|
|
|
|
|
assert entries["child.txt"]["path"] == "ext/child.txt"
|
|
|
|
|
assert entries["child.txt"]["escape_read_only"] is True
|
|
|
|
|
assert str(target) not in json.dumps(listed)
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_self_referencing_symlink_filtered(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Symlink pointing to the workspace root itself must be filtered out."""
|
2026-06-23 06:52:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if not w._DIR_FD_OK:
|
|
|
|
|
pytest.skip("cycle filtering is platform-dependent without dir_fd")
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
ws = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("ws")
|
|
|
|
|
(ws / "file.txt").write_text("data")
|
|
|
|
|
(ws / "loop").symlink_to(ws)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sid, _ = make_session(cleanup_test_sessions, ws)
|
|
|
|
|
listing = get(f"/api/list?session_id={sid}&path=.")
|
|
|
|
|
names = [e["name"] for e in listing["entries"]]
|
|
|
|
|
assert "loop" not in names, "Self-referencing symlink should be filtered"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_ancestor_symlink_filtered(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Symlink pointing to a parent of the workspace must be filtered out."""
|
2026-06-23 06:52:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if not w._DIR_FD_OK:
|
|
|
|
|
pytest.skip("cycle filtering is platform-dependent without dir_fd")
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
parent = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("parent")
|
|
|
|
|
ws = parent / "workspace"
|
|
|
|
|
ws.mkdir()
|
|
|
|
|
(ws / "file.txt").write_text("data")
|
|
|
|
|
# Symlink pointing to parent dir (ancestor of workspace)
|
|
|
|
|
(ws / "up").symlink_to(parent)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sid, _ = make_session(cleanup_test_sessions, ws)
|
|
|
|
|
listing = get(f"/api/list?session_id={sid}&path=.")
|
|
|
|
|
names = [e["name"] for e in listing["entries"]]
|
|
|
|
|
assert "up" not in names, "Ancestor symlink should be filtered"
|
|
|
|
|
|
Release v0.51.221 — Release GO (stage-p3e — block all workspace symlink escapes + portable TOCTOU hardening [security]) (#3398) (#3451)
* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 23:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Mutually recursive symlinks should be skipped instead of raising RuntimeError."""
|
|
|
|
|
ws = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("ws")
|
|
|
|
|
(ws / "a").symlink_to(ws / "b")
|
|
|
|
|
(ws / "b").symlink_to(ws / "a")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sid, _ = make_session(cleanup_test_sessions, ws)
|
|
|
|
|
listing = get(f"/api/list?session_id={sid}&path=.")
|
|
|
|
|
names = [e["name"] for e in listing["entries"]]
|
|
|
|
|
assert "a" not in names
|
|
|
|
|
assert "b" not in names
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_symlink_cycle_in_subdir(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
|
Release v0.51.221 — Release GO (stage-p3e — block all workspace symlink escapes + portable TOCTOU hardening [security]) (#3398) (#3451)
* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 23:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
"""External symlink subpaths must be blocked instead of traversed."""
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
ws = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("ws")
|
|
|
|
|
target = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("target")
|
|
|
|
|
(target / "subdir").mkdir()
|
|
|
|
|
# Create a symlink inside target that points back to workspace
|
|
|
|
|
(target / "subdir" / "back").symlink_to(ws)
|
|
|
|
|
(ws / "ext").symlink_to(target)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sid, _ = make_session(cleanup_test_sessions, ws)
|
2026-06-21 08:55:34 +00:00
|
|
|
# List root — external symlink is emitted as display-only, not traversed.
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
listing = get(f"/api/list?session_id={sid}&path=.")
|
2026-06-21 08:55:34 +00:00
|
|
|
entries = {e["name"]: e for e in listing["entries"]}
|
|
|
|
|
assert "ext" in entries
|
|
|
|
|
assert entries["ext"]["target_outside_workspace"] is True
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Release v0.51.221 — Release GO (stage-p3e — block all workspace symlink escapes + portable TOCTOU hardening [security]) (#3398) (#3451)
* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 23:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# Traversing into ext/subdir crosses the workspace boundary and is blocked.
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
get(f"/api/list?session_id={sid}&path=ext/subdir")
|
|
|
|
|
assert False, "External symlink subpath traversal should be blocked"
|
|
|
|
|
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
|
|
|
|
|
assert e.code in (400, 404, 500)
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Release v0.51.221 — Release GO (stage-p3e — block all workspace symlink escapes + portable TOCTOU hardening [security]) (#3398) (#3451)
* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 23:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_internal_symlink_file_entry(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Internal symlink to a file should have is_dir=False and include size."""
|
2026-06-23 06:52:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if not w._DIR_FD_OK:
|
|
|
|
|
pytest.skip("internal symlink metadata is platform-dependent without dir_fd")
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
ws = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("ws")
|
Release v0.51.221 — Release GO (stage-p3e — block all workspace symlink escapes + portable TOCTOU hardening [security]) (#3398) (#3451)
* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 23:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
real = ws / "real"
|
|
|
|
|
real.mkdir()
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
(real / "data.txt").write_text("hello world")
|
|
|
|
|
(ws / "link.txt").symlink_to(real / "data.txt")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sid, _ = make_session(cleanup_test_sessions, ws)
|
|
|
|
|
listing = get(f"/api/list?session_id={sid}&path=.")
|
|
|
|
|
link = [e for e in listing["entries"] if e["name"] == "link.txt"]
|
|
|
|
|
assert len(link) == 1
|
|
|
|
|
assert link[0]["type"] == "symlink"
|
|
|
|
|
assert link[0]["is_dir"] is False
|
|
|
|
|
assert link[0]["size"] == 11 # len("hello world")
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-21 08:55:34 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_external_symlink_file_emitted_as_display_only(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
|
|
|
|
|
"""External symlink files are emitted with target_outside_workspace=True (display-only)."""
|
Release v0.51.221 — Release GO (stage-p3e — block all workspace symlink escapes + portable TOCTOU hardening [security]) (#3398) (#3451)
* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 23:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
ws = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("ws")
|
|
|
|
|
real = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("real")
|
|
|
|
|
(real / "data.txt").write_text("hello world")
|
|
|
|
|
(ws / "link.txt").symlink_to(real / "data.txt")
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
sid, _ = make_session(cleanup_test_sessions, ws)
|
|
|
|
|
listing = get(f"/api/list?session_id={sid}&path=.")
|
2026-06-21 08:55:34 +00:00
|
|
|
entries = {e["name"]: e for e in listing["entries"]}
|
|
|
|
|
assert "link.txt" in entries
|
|
|
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|
assert entries["link.txt"]["type"] == "symlink"
|
|
|
|
|
assert entries["link.txt"]["target_outside_workspace"] is True
|
|
|
|
|
assert entries["link.txt"]["is_dir"] is False
|
Release v0.51.221 — Release GO (stage-p3e — block all workspace symlink escapes + portable TOCTOU hardening [security]) (#3398) (#3451)
* [security] fix(workspace): block all symlink escapes from the selected workspace (#3398, @Hinotoi-agent)
Previously safe_resolve_ws allowed a symlink placed inside a workspace to resolve
to an external host path as long as it wasn't a system dir (/etc, /proc, etc).
But the workspace file API is reachable by LLM agent tool calls (read_file_content),
so an in-workspace symlink to ~/.ssh, ~/.hermes/auth.json (credentials), etc. was a
real read path. Now ANY symlink escape is blocked: safe_resolve_ws resolves and
requires the result stay under the workspace root; list_dir hides escaping symlinks
(they could never be opened anyway); internal symlinks resolving back under the
workspace still work. Updated the upload symlink-target test to accept the new
400 'Path traversal blocked' rejection (was 403) — the invariant (nothing lands
outside the workspace) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(changelog): v0.51.221 release header for #3398 symlink-escape security fix
* [security] harden workspace file API against symlink-swap TOCTOU via portable anchored openat-walk (#3398 follow-up)
Codex review of #3398 flagged that safe_resolve_ws() validates a path but
list_dir/read_file_content/upload/extraction then re-open by pathname, leaving a
TOCTOU window: a symlink swapped in AFTER the check could still escape. (This
race pre-existed #3398; closing it here so the containment is complete.)
A first attempt used /proc/self/fd for the post-open containment check, but that
BRICKS workspace browsing on macOS/Windows (no /proc → every read/list rejected).
This version is portable:
- open_anchored_fd(): opens the (already symlink-resolved) target
component-by-component from the workspace root via openat (dir_fd) + O_NOFOLLOW.
Every component must be a real non-symlink entry, so a component swapped to a
symlink mid-flight is refused. No /proc dependency. Used by read_file_content
(read from the fd) and list_dir (enumerate via os.scandir(fd), per-entry
fstatat/readlinkat).
- open_anchored_create_fd(): same anchored walk for writes, creating missing
intermediate dirs with mkdir(dir_fd=) and the leaf with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
O_NOFOLLOW. Used by the workspace upload write AND archive (zip+tar) member
writes, anchored against the TRUE workspace root (not the mutable extraction
dest_dir, closing Codex's root-swap finding). fd-leak-safe on rejection.
- Portability: gated on os.supports_dir_fd; platforms without it (Windows, where
symlink creation needs admin) fall back to a plain O_NOFOLLOW open/exclusive
create — no new race protection but no regression vs the prior path-based code.
Legit in-workspace symlinks still resolve and read/list fine (safe_resolve_ws
collapses them to a real in-workspace path, which the anchored walk then opens).
Verified: the swap-race leaks external content against the old path-based read
and is blocked here; macOS-class symlinked-root workspaces work; no fd leak over
300 rejected creates. Adds TOCTOU + anchored-create regression tests.
* [security] close 3 more #3398 TOCTOU gaps from Codex r3: root-swap, pre-create mkdir, Windows list_dir fallback
Codex round-3 review found three residual issues in the anchored openat-walk:
1. (CORE) The workspace ROOT itself could be swapped to a symlink after
resolve() but before the root os.open() — add _O_NOFOLLOW to the root open in
open_anchored_fd() and open_anchored_create_fd() (and make_anchored_dir()), so
a raced root symlink is refused. Verified: root-swap race now blocked.
2. (SILENT) Upload/extraction still did pathname Path.mkdir() AFTER the
containment check, so a raced symlink component could make the server create
dirs outside the workspace before the anchored file create rejected. Removed
the redundant member_path.parent.mkdir() calls (open_anchored_create_fd
already creates intermediates via anchored mkdirat) and replaced the two
base-dir mkdirs (upload target dir + archive extraction root) with a new
make_anchored_dir() that walks from the true workspace root via
openat+O_NOFOLLOW + mkdir(dir_fd=).
3. (CORE) list_dir() unconditionally used os.scandir(fd)/os.stat(dir_fd=)/
os.readlink(dir_fd=), which would brick workspace browsing on platforms
without os.supports_dir_fd (Windows). Split list_dir() into a _DIR_FD_OK
anchored branch and a path-based fallback branch (prior behaviour) sharing one
_process() entry builder. open_anchored_create_fd()'s Windows fallback now also
creates parent dirs.
Adds regression tests: no-dir_fd fallback (list+read+create+symlink filtering)
and the root-swap race. All prior TOCTOU + anchored-create tests still green.
* fix(workspace): portable symlink-loop filtering in list_dir via follow-stat ELOOP
CI on Python 3.13 caught test_mutual_symlink_loop_filtered failing: a mutual
symlink loop (a->b->a) was NOT filtered from the listing. Root cause: the new
readlink-based cycle detection relied on (target_resolved / raw_link).resolve()
RAISING on a loop, but Path.resolve() loop handling differs by Python version
(3.11 raises RuntimeError, 3.13 can return a path), so the loop slipped through
on 3.13.
Fix: compute a version-independent 'reachable' flag per symlink via
os.stat(..., follow_symlinks=True) — the syscall reliably returns ELOOP for
mutual/self loops and ENOENT for broken targets on every platform/version. A
symlink whose follow-stat raises can never be opened, so list_dir filters it.
Applied in both the dir_fd-anchored branch (fd-relative stat) and the Windows
path-based fallback branch. Mutual loop now filtered on all versions.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-02 23:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
fix: batch triage — 12 contributor PRs (v0.50.227) (#1168)
Merged as v0.50.227. 2634 tests passing, browser QA 21/21 (desktop + mobile). Full attribution below.
Thanks to all 12 contributors:
@jundev0001 (#1138), @franksong2702 (#1142, #1157, #1162), @dso2ng (#1143), @bergeouss (#1145, #1146, #1156, #1159), @jasonjcwu (#1149), @ccqqlo (#1161), @frap129 (#1165)
Two fixes applied during integration and two more by the independent reviewer (@nesquena):
- messages.js: per-turn cost delta capture order (#1159)
- workspace.py: symlink target blocked-roots check + HOME sanity guard (#1149, #1165)
- panels.js: cron unread counter bookkeeping (in-loop increment bug)
- tests/test_symlink_cycle_detection.py: register workspace before session/new
2026-04-27 20:34:59 +00:00
|
|
|
def test_path_traversal_still_blocked(self, cleanup_test_sessions, tmp_path_factory):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Raw .. traversal must still be blocked even with symlink support."""
|
|
|
|
|
ws = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("ws")
|
|
|
|
|
sid, _ = make_session(cleanup_test_sessions, ws)
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
get(f"/api/list?session_id={sid}&path=../../../etc")
|
|
|
|
|
assert False, "Path traversal should be blocked"
|
|
|
|
|
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
|
|
|
|
|
assert e.code in (400, 404, 500)
|