HERMES-GIELIE/api/helpers.py

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"""
2026-03-31 07:02:47 +00:00
Hermes Web UI -- HTTP helper functions.
"""
import json as _json
from pathlib import Path
from api.config import IMAGE_EXTS, MD_EXTS
def require(body: dict, *fields) -> None:
"""Phase D: Validate required fields. Raises ValueError with clean message."""
missing = [f for f in fields if not body.get(f) and body.get(f) != 0]
if missing:
raise ValueError(f"Missing required field(s): {', '.join(missing)}")
def bad(handler, msg, status: int=400):
"""Return a clean JSON error response."""
return j(handler, {'error': msg}, status=status)
release: v0.39.0 — security hardening, 12 fixes (#171) * Security: harden auth, CSRF, SSRF, XSS, and env race conditions Twelve fixes from a full security audit: CRITICAL - Add CSRF Origin/Referer validation on all POST endpoints (prevents cross-origin abuse of self-update, settings, file ops) HIGH - Unify password hashing: config.py now uses PBKDF2 (600k iters) instead of single-iteration SHA-256 - Add per-IP rate limiting on login (5 attempts/60s, 429 on excess) MEDIUM - Validate session IDs as hex-only before filesystem operations (prevents path traversal via crafted session ID) - SSRF: resolve DNS before private-IP check in model fetching (prevents DNS rebinding to internal services) - Warn loudly when binding non-loopback without password set - SSE env var mutations: wrap sync chat + streaming restore in _ENV_LOCK - Force Content-Disposition:attachment for HTML/XHTML/SVG uploads (prevents stored XSS via uploaded files) LOW - Extend HMAC session signature from 64 to 128 bits - Add resolve()+relative_to() check on skills path construction - Set Secure flag on session cookie when connection is HTTPS - Sanitize exception messages to strip filesystem paths No breaking changes. All fixes are backward-compatible. * fix: use getattr for Secure cookie SSL detection handler.request.getpeercert raises AttributeError on plain sockets (non-SSL). Use getattr(..., None) to safely check for SSL. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * tests: add sprint 29 security hardening coverage (PR #171) 33 tests covering all 12 security fixes: - CSRF origin/referer validation - Login rate limiting (5 attempts/60s) - Session ID hex validation (path traversal prevention) - Error path sanitization (_sanitize_error) - Secure cookie getattr safety - HMAC signature length (64->128 bit) - Skills path traversal prevention - Content-Disposition for HTML/SVG/XHTML - PBKDF2 password hashing verification - Non-loopback startup warning - SSRF DNS guard code presence - _ENV_LOCK export from streaming module * release: v0.39.0 — security hardening, 12 fixes (#171) --------- Co-authored-by: betamod <matthew.sloly@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Nathan Esquenazi <nesquena@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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def _sanitize_error(e: Exception) -> str:
"""Strip filesystem paths from exception messages before returning to client."""
import re
msg = str(e)
# Remove absolute paths (Unix and Windows)
msg = re.sub(r'(?:(?:/[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+)+|(?:[A-Z]:\\[^\s]+))', '<path>', msg)
return msg
def safe_resolve(root: Path, requested: str) -> Path:
"""Resolve a relative path inside root, raising ValueError on traversal."""
resolved = (root / requested).resolve()
resolved.relative_to(root.resolve()) # raises ValueError if outside root
return resolved
def _security_headers(handler):
"""Add security headers to every response."""
handler.send_header('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff')
handler.send_header('X-Frame-Options', 'DENY')
handler.send_header('Referrer-Policy', 'same-origin')
handler.send_header(
'Content-Security-Policy',
"default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
"img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; "
"base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'"
)
handler.send_header(
'Permissions-Policy',
'camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()'
)
def j(handler, payload, status: int=200) -> None:
"""Send a JSON response."""
body = _json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2).encode('utf-8')
handler.send_response(status)
handler.send_header('Content-Type', 'application/json; charset=utf-8')
handler.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(body)))
handler.send_header('Cache-Control', 'no-store')
_security_headers(handler)
handler.end_headers()
handler.wfile.write(body)
def t(handler, payload, status: int=200, content_type: str='text/plain; charset=utf-8') -> None:
"""Send a plain text or HTML response."""
body = payload if isinstance(payload, bytes) else str(payload).encode('utf-8')
handler.send_response(status)
handler.send_header('Content-Type', content_type)
handler.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(body)))
handler.send_header('Cache-Control', 'no-store')
_security_headers(handler)
handler.end_headers()
handler.wfile.write(body)
MAX_BODY_BYTES = 20 * 1024 * 1024 # 20MB limit for non-upload POST bodies
def read_body(handler) -> dict:
"""Read and JSON-parse a POST request body (capped at 20MB)."""
length = int(handler.headers.get('Content-Length', 0))
if length > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
raise ValueError(f'Request body too large ({length} bytes, max {MAX_BODY_BYTES})')
raw = handler.rfile.read(length) if length else b'{}'
try:
return _json.loads(raw)
except Exception:
return {}