HERMES-GIELIE/tests/test_sprint19.py

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"""
Sprint 19 Tests: auth/login, security headers, request size limit.
"""
import json, urllib.error, urllib.request
from tests._pytest_port import BASE
def get(path, headers=None):
req = urllib.request.Request(BASE + path)
if headers:
for k, v in headers.items():
req.add_header(k, v)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as r:
return json.loads(r.read()), r.status, dict(r.headers)
def post(path, body=None, headers=None):
data = json.dumps(body or {}).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(BASE + path, data=data,
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"})
if headers:
for k, v in headers.items():
req.add_header(k, v)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as r:
return json.loads(r.read()), r.status, dict(r.headers)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
return json.loads(e.read()), e.code, dict(e.headers)
# ── Auth status (no password configured in test env) ──────────────────────
def test_auth_status_disabled():
"""Auth should be disabled by default (no password set)."""
d, status, _ = get("/api/auth/status")
assert status == 200
assert d["auth_enabled"] is False
def test_login_when_auth_disabled():
"""Login should succeed trivially when auth is not enabled."""
d, status, _ = post("/api/auth/login", {"password": "anything"})
assert status == 200
assert d["ok"] is True
def test_all_routes_accessible_without_auth():
"""When auth is disabled, all routes should work without cookies."""
d, status, _ = get("/api/sessions")
assert status == 200
assert "sessions" in d
def test_login_page_served():
"""GET /login should return the login page HTML."""
req = urllib.request.Request(BASE + "/login")
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as r:
html = r.read().decode()
assert r.status == 200
assert "Sign in" in html
assert "Hermes" in html
assert 'src="static/login.js?v=' in html
assert 'src="/static/login.js"' not in html
def test_login_page_cache_busts_login_script():
"""GET /login must version login.js so stale cache/SW entries cannot trap old auth code."""
from api import routes
assert "static/login.js?v={{WEBUI_VERSION}}" in routes._LOGIN_PAGE_HTML
def test_login_route_injects_webui_version_for_login_script():
"""The /login route should replace the login.js version placeholder."""
from pathlib import Path
src = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1].joinpath("api", "routes.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
login_block = src[src.find('if parsed.path == "/login"'):src.find('if parsed.path == "/api/auth/status"')]
assert "WEBUI_VERSION" in login_block
assert "{{WEBUI_VERSION}}" in login_block
# ── Security headers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_security_headers_on_json():
"""JSON responses should include security headers."""
d, status, headers = get("/api/auth/status")
assert status == 200
assert headers.get("X-Content-Type-Options") == "nosniff"
assert headers.get("X-Frame-Options") == "DENY"
assert headers.get("Referrer-Policy") == "same-origin"
def test_security_headers_on_health():
"""Health endpoint should include security headers."""
d, status, headers = get("/health")
assert status == 200
assert headers.get("X-Content-Type-Options") == "nosniff"
v0.50.25: mobile scroll, import timestamps, profile security, mic fallback (#404) * fix: restore mobile chat scrolling and drawer close (#397) - static/style.css: add min-height:0 to .layout and .main (flex shrink chain fix for mobile scroll) - static/style.css: add -webkit-overflow-scrolling:touch, touch-action:pan-y, overscroll-behavior-y:contain to .messages - static/boot.js: call closeMobileSidebar() on new-conversation button onclick and Ctrl+K shortcut - tests/test_mobile_layout.py: 41 new lines covering all three CSS fixes and both JS call sites Original PR by @Jordan-SkyLF * fix: preserve imported session timestamps (#395) - api/models.py: add touch_updated_at: bool = True param to Session.save(); import_cli_session() accepts created_at/updated_at kwargs and saves with touch_updated_at=False - api/routes.py: extract created_at/updated_at from get_cli_sessions() metadata and forward to import_cli_session(); use touch_updated_at=False on post-import save - tests/test_gateway_sync.py: +53 lines — integration test verifying imported session keeps original timestamp and sorts correctly vs newer sessions; also fix: add WebUI session file cleanup in finally block Original PR by @Jordan-SkyLF * fix(profiles): block path traversal in profile switch and delete flows (#399) Master was vulnerable: switch_profile and delete_profile_api joined user-supplied profile names directly into filesystem paths with no validation. An attacker could send '../../etc/passwd' as a profile name to traverse outside the profiles directory. - api/profiles.py: add _resolve_named_profile_home(name) — validates name with ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$ regex then enforces path containment via candidate.resolve().relative_to(profiles_root); use in switch_profile() - api/profiles.py: add _validate_profile_name() call to delete_profile_api() entry - api/routes.py: add _validate_profile_name() call at HTTP handler level for both /api/profile/switch and /api/profile/delete (fail-fast at API boundary) - tests/test_profile_path_security.py: 3 tests — traversal rejected, valid name passes Cherry-picked commit aae7a30 from @Hinotoi-agent (PR was 62 commits behind master) * feat: add desktop microphone transcription fallback (#396) Mic button now works in browsers that support getUserMedia/MediaRecorder but lack SpeechRecognition (e.g. Firefox desktop, some Chromium builds). - static/boot.js: detect _canRecordAudio (navigator.mediaDevices + getUserMedia + MediaRecorder); keep mic button enabled when either SpeechRecognition or MediaRecorder is available; MediaRecorder fallback records audio, sends blob to /api/transcribe, inserts transcript into the composer; _stopMic() handles all three states (recognition, mediaRecorder, neither) - api/upload.py: add transcribe_audio() helper — saves uploaded blob to temp file, calls transcription_tools.transcribe_audio(), always cleans up temp file - api/routes.py: add /api/transcribe POST handler — CSRF protected, auth-gated, 20MB limit, returns {text:...} or {error:...} - api/helpers.py: change Permissions-Policy microphone=() to microphone=(self) (required to allow getUserMedia in the same origin) - tests/test_voice_transcribe_endpoint.py: 87 new lines — 3 tests with mocked transcription - tests/test_sprint19.py: +1 regression guard (microphone=(self) in Permissions-Policy) - tests/test_sprint20.py: 3 updated tests for new fallback-capability checks Original PR by @Jordan-SkyLF * docs: v0.50.25 release — version badge and CHANGELOG --------- Co-authored-by: Nathan Esquenazi <nesquena@gmail.com>
2026-04-14 05:11:45 +00:00
def test_permissions_policy_does_not_disable_microphone():
"""Permissions-Policy must not hard-disable microphone access for same-origin voice input."""
_, status, headers = get("/health")
assert status == 200
policy = headers.get("Permissions-Policy", "")
assert policy, "Permissions-Policy header missing"
assert "microphone=()" not in policy, \
"Permissions-Policy must not block microphone access or desktop/mobile voice input cannot work"
def test_cache_control_no_store():
"""API responses should have Cache-Control: no-store."""
d, status, headers = get("/api/sessions")
assert headers.get("Cache-Control") == "no-store"
# ── Settings password field ──────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_settings_password_hash_not_exposed():
"""GET /api/settings must never expose the stored password hash."""
d, status, _ = get("/api/settings")
assert status == 200
assert "password_hash" not in d # security: never send hash to client
def test_settings_save_preserves_other_fields():
"""Saving settings should not break existing fields."""
# Get current settings
current, _, _ = get("/api/settings")
# Save with just send_key
d, status, _ = post("/api/settings", {"send_key": "enter"})
assert status == 200
# Verify other fields still present
updated, _, _ = get("/api/settings")
assert "default_model" in updated
assert "default_workspace" in updated
def test_settings_password_hash_not_directly_settable():
"""POST /api/settings with password_hash must not overwrite the stored hash."""
# Attempt to set a raw hash directly (attack vector)
post("/api/settings", {"password_hash": "deadbeef" * 8})
# Settings response must not expose it regardless
updated, status, _ = get("/api/settings")
assert status == 200
assert "password_hash" not in updated