2026-03-31 03:40:19 +00:00
|
|
|
"""
|
Hermes Web UI — Sprints 11-14: multi-provider models, settings, session QoL, alerts, polish
Sprint 11 (v0.13): multi-provider model support, streaming smoothness
- Dynamic model dropdown populated from configured API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic,
Google, DeepSeek, GLM, Kimi, MiniMax, OpenRouter, Nous Portal)
- Scroll pinning during streaming (no forced scroll when user has scrolled up)
- All route handlers extracted to api/routes.py (server.py now ~76 lines)
Sprint 12 (v0.14): settings panel, SSE reconnect, session QoL
- Settings panel (gear icon) -- persist default model and workspace server-side
- SSE auto-reconnect on network blips
- Pin/star sessions to top of sidebar
- Import session from JSON export
Sprint 13 (v0.15): cron alerts, background errors, session duplicate, tab title
- Cron completion alerts: toast per completion + unread badge on Tasks tab
- Background agent error banner when a non-active session errors mid-stream
- Session duplicate button
- Browser tab title reflects active session name
Sprint 14 (v0.16): Mermaid diagrams, file ops, session archive/tags, timestamps
- Mermaid diagram rendering inline (dark theme, lazy CDN load)
- File rename (double-click in file tree) and create folder
- Session archive (hide without deleting, toggle to show)
- Session tags -- #hashtag in title becomes colored chip + click-to-filter
- Message timestamps (HH:MM on hover, full date as tooltip)
Test suite: 224 tests across 14 sprint files + regression gate, 0 failures.
2026-03-31 07:02:47 +00:00
|
|
|
Hermes Web UI -- HTTP helper functions.
|
2026-03-31 03:40:19 +00:00
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
import json as _json
|
v0.46.0: security, Docker UID/GID, model discovery, i18n, cancel fix
* fix: decode HTML entities before markdown processing + zh/zh-Hant translations (#239)
Adds decode() helper in renderMd() to fix double-escaping of HTML entities
from LLM output (e.g. <code> becoming &lt;code&gt; instead
of rendering). XSS-safe: decode runs before esc(), only 5 entity patterns.
Also adds 40+ missing zh (Simplified Chinese) translation keys and a new
zh-Hant (Traditional Chinese) locale with 163 keys.
Fix applied: removed duplicate settings_label_notifications key in both
zh and zh-Hant locales.
Fixes #240
* fix: restore custom model list discovery with config api key (#238)
get_available_models() now reads api_key from config.yaml before env vars:
1. model.api_key
2. providers.<active>.api_key / providers.custom.api_key
3. env var fallbacks (HERMES_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.)
Also adds OpenAI/Python User-Agent header and a regression test covering
authenticated /v1/models discovery.
Fixes users with LM Studio / Ollama custom endpoints configured in
config.yaml whose model picker silently collapsed to the default model.
* feat: Docker UID/GID matching to avoid root-owned .hermes files (#237)
Adds docker_init.bash with hermeswebuitoo/hermeswebui user pattern so
container files match the host user UID/GID. Prevents .hermes volume
mounts from being owned by root when using a non-root host user.
Configure via WANTED_UID and WANTED_GID env vars (default 1000/1000).
Readme updated with setup instructions.
Fix applied: removed duplicate WANTED_GID=1000 line in docker-compose.yml
that was overriding the ${GID:-1000} variable expansion.
* security: redact credentials from API responses and fix credential file permissions (#243)
Adds response-layer credential redaction to three endpoints:
- GET /api/session — messages[], tool_calls[], and title
- GET /api/session/export — download also redacted
- SSE done event — session payload in stream
- GET /api/memory — MEMORY.md and USER.md content
Adds api/startup.py with fix_credential_permissions() at server startup.
Adds 13 tests in tests/test_security_redaction.py.
Merged with #237 container detection changes in server.py.
* fix: cancel button now interrupts agent and cleans up UI state (#244)
Wires agent.interrupt() into cancel_stream() so the backend actually
stops tool execution when the user clicks Cancel, rather than only
stopping the SSE stream while the agent keeps running.
Changes:
- api/config.py: adds AGENT_INSTANCES dict (stream_id -> AIAgent)
- api/streaming.py: stores agent in AGENT_INSTANCES after creation,
checks CANCEL_FLAGS immediately after store (race condition fix),
calls agent.interrupt() in cancel_stream(), cleans up in finally block
- static/boot.js: removes stale setStatus(cancelling) call
- static/messages.js: setBusy(false)/setStatus('') unconditionally on cancel
Race condition fix: after storing agent in AGENT_INSTANCES, immediately
checks if CANCEL_FLAGS[stream_id] is already set (cancel arrived during
agent init) and interrupts before starting. Check is inside the same
STREAMS_LOCK acquisition, making it atomic.
New test file: tests/test_cancel_interrupt.py with 6 unit tests.
* docs: v0.46.0 release notes, bump version, update test counts
---------
Co-authored-by: Nathan Esquenazi <nesquena@gmail.com>
2026-04-11 17:17:52 +00:00
|
|
|
import re as _re
|
2026-03-31 03:40:19 +00:00
|
|
|
from pathlib import Path
|
|
|
|
|
from api.config import IMAGE_EXTS, MD_EXTS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-04-05 06:30:20 +00:00
|
|
|
def require(body: dict, *fields) -> None:
|
2026-03-31 03:40:19 +00:00
|
|
|
"""Phase D: Validate required fields. Raises ValueError with clean message."""
|
|
|
|
|
missing = [f for f in fields if not body.get(f) and body.get(f) != 0]
|
|
|
|
|
if missing:
|
|
|
|
|
raise ValueError(f"Missing required field(s): {', '.join(missing)}")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-04-05 06:30:20 +00:00
|
|
|
def bad(handler, msg, status: int=400):
|
2026-03-31 03:40:19 +00:00
|
|
|
"""Return a clean JSON error response."""
|
|
|
|
|
return j(handler, {'error': msg}, status=status)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
release: v0.39.0 — security hardening, 12 fixes (#171)
* Security: harden auth, CSRF, SSRF, XSS, and env race conditions
Twelve fixes from a full security audit:
CRITICAL
- Add CSRF Origin/Referer validation on all POST endpoints
(prevents cross-origin abuse of self-update, settings, file ops)
HIGH
- Unify password hashing: config.py now uses PBKDF2 (600k iters)
instead of single-iteration SHA-256
- Add per-IP rate limiting on login (5 attempts/60s, 429 on excess)
MEDIUM
- Validate session IDs as hex-only before filesystem operations
(prevents path traversal via crafted session ID)
- SSRF: resolve DNS before private-IP check in model fetching
(prevents DNS rebinding to internal services)
- Warn loudly when binding non-loopback without password set
- SSE env var mutations: wrap sync chat + streaming restore in _ENV_LOCK
- Force Content-Disposition:attachment for HTML/XHTML/SVG uploads
(prevents stored XSS via uploaded files)
LOW
- Extend HMAC session signature from 64 to 128 bits
- Add resolve()+relative_to() check on skills path construction
- Set Secure flag on session cookie when connection is HTTPS
- Sanitize exception messages to strip filesystem paths
No breaking changes. All fixes are backward-compatible.
* fix: use getattr for Secure cookie SSL detection
handler.request.getpeercert raises AttributeError on plain sockets
(non-SSL). Use getattr(..., None) to safely check for SSL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* tests: add sprint 29 security hardening coverage (PR #171)
33 tests covering all 12 security fixes:
- CSRF origin/referer validation
- Login rate limiting (5 attempts/60s)
- Session ID hex validation (path traversal prevention)
- Error path sanitization (_sanitize_error)
- Secure cookie getattr safety
- HMAC signature length (64->128 bit)
- Skills path traversal prevention
- Content-Disposition for HTML/SVG/XHTML
- PBKDF2 password hashing verification
- Non-loopback startup warning
- SSRF DNS guard code presence
- _ENV_LOCK export from streaming module
* release: v0.39.0 — security hardening, 12 fixes (#171)
---------
Co-authored-by: betamod <matthew.sloly@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Nathan Esquenazi <nesquena@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-08 05:26:03 +00:00
|
|
|
def _sanitize_error(e: Exception) -> str:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Strip filesystem paths from exception messages before returning to client."""
|
|
|
|
|
import re
|
|
|
|
|
msg = str(e)
|
|
|
|
|
# Remove absolute paths (Unix and Windows)
|
|
|
|
|
msg = re.sub(r'(?:(?:/[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+)+|(?:[A-Z]:\\[^\s]+))', '<path>', msg)
|
|
|
|
|
return msg
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-03-31 03:40:19 +00:00
|
|
|
def safe_resolve(root: Path, requested: str) -> Path:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Resolve a relative path inside root, raising ValueError on traversal."""
|
|
|
|
|
resolved = (root / requested).resolve()
|
|
|
|
|
resolved.relative_to(root.resolve()) # raises ValueError if outside root
|
|
|
|
|
return resolved
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat: Sprint 19 — password auth, security headers, login page
Auth system (off by default, zero friction for localhost):
- New api/auth.py module: password hashing (SHA-256 + STATE_DIR salt),
signed HMAC session cookies (24h TTL), auth middleware
- Enable via HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD env var or Settings panel
- Minimal dark-themed login page at /login (self-contained HTML)
- POST /api/auth/login, /api/auth/logout, GET /api/auth/status
- Settings panel: "Access Password" field + "Sign Out" button
- password_hash added to settings.json (null = auth disabled)
Security hardening:
- Security headers on all responses: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,
X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: same-origin
- POST body size limit: 20MB cap in read_body() to prevent DoS
Closes #23. 9 new tests. Total: 304 passed, 0 regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-03 12:53:26 +00:00
|
|
|
def _security_headers(handler):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Add security headers to every response."""
|
|
|
|
|
handler.send_header('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff')
|
|
|
|
|
handler.send_header('X-Frame-Options', 'DENY')
|
|
|
|
|
handler.send_header('Referrer-Policy', 'same-origin')
|
2026-04-10 01:07:07 +00:00
|
|
|
handler.send_header(
|
|
|
|
|
'Content-Security-Policy',
|
2026-04-10 02:07:51 +00:00
|
|
|
"default-src 'self'; "
|
|
|
|
|
"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net; "
|
|
|
|
|
"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net; "
|
2026-04-10 01:07:07 +00:00
|
|
|
"img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; "
|
|
|
|
|
"base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
handler.send_header(
|
|
|
|
|
'Permissions-Policy',
|
|
|
|
|
'camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()'
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
feat: Sprint 19 — password auth, security headers, login page
Auth system (off by default, zero friction for localhost):
- New api/auth.py module: password hashing (SHA-256 + STATE_DIR salt),
signed HMAC session cookies (24h TTL), auth middleware
- Enable via HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD env var or Settings panel
- Minimal dark-themed login page at /login (self-contained HTML)
- POST /api/auth/login, /api/auth/logout, GET /api/auth/status
- Settings panel: "Access Password" field + "Sign Out" button
- password_hash added to settings.json (null = auth disabled)
Security hardening:
- Security headers on all responses: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,
X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: same-origin
- POST body size limit: 20MB cap in read_body() to prevent DoS
Closes #23. 9 new tests. Total: 304 passed, 0 regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-03 12:53:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-04-05 06:30:20 +00:00
|
|
|
def j(handler, payload, status: int=200) -> None:
|
2026-03-31 03:40:19 +00:00
|
|
|
"""Send a JSON response."""
|
|
|
|
|
body = _json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2).encode('utf-8')
|
|
|
|
|
handler.send_response(status)
|
|
|
|
|
handler.send_header('Content-Type', 'application/json; charset=utf-8')
|
|
|
|
|
handler.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(body)))
|
|
|
|
|
handler.send_header('Cache-Control', 'no-store')
|
feat: Sprint 19 — password auth, security headers, login page
Auth system (off by default, zero friction for localhost):
- New api/auth.py module: password hashing (SHA-256 + STATE_DIR salt),
signed HMAC session cookies (24h TTL), auth middleware
- Enable via HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD env var or Settings panel
- Minimal dark-themed login page at /login (self-contained HTML)
- POST /api/auth/login, /api/auth/logout, GET /api/auth/status
- Settings panel: "Access Password" field + "Sign Out" button
- password_hash added to settings.json (null = auth disabled)
Security hardening:
- Security headers on all responses: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,
X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: same-origin
- POST body size limit: 20MB cap in read_body() to prevent DoS
Closes #23. 9 new tests. Total: 304 passed, 0 regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-03 12:53:26 +00:00
|
|
|
_security_headers(handler)
|
2026-03-31 03:40:19 +00:00
|
|
|
handler.end_headers()
|
|
|
|
|
handler.wfile.write(body)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-04-05 06:30:20 +00:00
|
|
|
def t(handler, payload, status: int=200, content_type: str='text/plain; charset=utf-8') -> None:
|
2026-03-31 03:40:19 +00:00
|
|
|
"""Send a plain text or HTML response."""
|
|
|
|
|
body = payload if isinstance(payload, bytes) else str(payload).encode('utf-8')
|
|
|
|
|
handler.send_response(status)
|
|
|
|
|
handler.send_header('Content-Type', content_type)
|
|
|
|
|
handler.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(body)))
|
|
|
|
|
handler.send_header('Cache-Control', 'no-store')
|
feat: Sprint 19 — password auth, security headers, login page
Auth system (off by default, zero friction for localhost):
- New api/auth.py module: password hashing (SHA-256 + STATE_DIR salt),
signed HMAC session cookies (24h TTL), auth middleware
- Enable via HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD env var or Settings panel
- Minimal dark-themed login page at /login (self-contained HTML)
- POST /api/auth/login, /api/auth/logout, GET /api/auth/status
- Settings panel: "Access Password" field + "Sign Out" button
- password_hash added to settings.json (null = auth disabled)
Security hardening:
- Security headers on all responses: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,
X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: same-origin
- POST body size limit: 20MB cap in read_body() to prevent DoS
Closes #23. 9 new tests. Total: 304 passed, 0 regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-03 12:53:26 +00:00
|
|
|
_security_headers(handler)
|
2026-03-31 03:40:19 +00:00
|
|
|
handler.end_headers()
|
|
|
|
|
handler.wfile.write(body)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat: Sprint 19 — password auth, security headers, login page
Auth system (off by default, zero friction for localhost):
- New api/auth.py module: password hashing (SHA-256 + STATE_DIR salt),
signed HMAC session cookies (24h TTL), auth middleware
- Enable via HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD env var or Settings panel
- Minimal dark-themed login page at /login (self-contained HTML)
- POST /api/auth/login, /api/auth/logout, GET /api/auth/status
- Settings panel: "Access Password" field + "Sign Out" button
- password_hash added to settings.json (null = auth disabled)
Security hardening:
- Security headers on all responses: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,
X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: same-origin
- POST body size limit: 20MB cap in read_body() to prevent DoS
Closes #23. 9 new tests. Total: 304 passed, 0 regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-03 12:53:26 +00:00
|
|
|
MAX_BODY_BYTES = 20 * 1024 * 1024 # 20MB limit for non-upload POST bodies
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
v0.46.0: security, Docker UID/GID, model discovery, i18n, cancel fix
* fix: decode HTML entities before markdown processing + zh/zh-Hant translations (#239)
Adds decode() helper in renderMd() to fix double-escaping of HTML entities
from LLM output (e.g. <code> becoming &lt;code&gt; instead
of rendering). XSS-safe: decode runs before esc(), only 5 entity patterns.
Also adds 40+ missing zh (Simplified Chinese) translation keys and a new
zh-Hant (Traditional Chinese) locale with 163 keys.
Fix applied: removed duplicate settings_label_notifications key in both
zh and zh-Hant locales.
Fixes #240
* fix: restore custom model list discovery with config api key (#238)
get_available_models() now reads api_key from config.yaml before env vars:
1. model.api_key
2. providers.<active>.api_key / providers.custom.api_key
3. env var fallbacks (HERMES_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.)
Also adds OpenAI/Python User-Agent header and a regression test covering
authenticated /v1/models discovery.
Fixes users with LM Studio / Ollama custom endpoints configured in
config.yaml whose model picker silently collapsed to the default model.
* feat: Docker UID/GID matching to avoid root-owned .hermes files (#237)
Adds docker_init.bash with hermeswebuitoo/hermeswebui user pattern so
container files match the host user UID/GID. Prevents .hermes volume
mounts from being owned by root when using a non-root host user.
Configure via WANTED_UID and WANTED_GID env vars (default 1000/1000).
Readme updated with setup instructions.
Fix applied: removed duplicate WANTED_GID=1000 line in docker-compose.yml
that was overriding the ${GID:-1000} variable expansion.
* security: redact credentials from API responses and fix credential file permissions (#243)
Adds response-layer credential redaction to three endpoints:
- GET /api/session — messages[], tool_calls[], and title
- GET /api/session/export — download also redacted
- SSE done event — session payload in stream
- GET /api/memory — MEMORY.md and USER.md content
Adds api/startup.py with fix_credential_permissions() at server startup.
Adds 13 tests in tests/test_security_redaction.py.
Merged with #237 container detection changes in server.py.
* fix: cancel button now interrupts agent and cleans up UI state (#244)
Wires agent.interrupt() into cancel_stream() so the backend actually
stops tool execution when the user clicks Cancel, rather than only
stopping the SSE stream while the agent keeps running.
Changes:
- api/config.py: adds AGENT_INSTANCES dict (stream_id -> AIAgent)
- api/streaming.py: stores agent in AGENT_INSTANCES after creation,
checks CANCEL_FLAGS immediately after store (race condition fix),
calls agent.interrupt() in cancel_stream(), cleans up in finally block
- static/boot.js: removes stale setStatus(cancelling) call
- static/messages.js: setBusy(false)/setStatus('') unconditionally on cancel
Race condition fix: after storing agent in AGENT_INSTANCES, immediately
checks if CANCEL_FLAGS[stream_id] is already set (cancel arrived during
agent init) and interrupts before starting. Check is inside the same
STREAMS_LOCK acquisition, making it atomic.
New test file: tests/test_cancel_interrupt.py with 6 unit tests.
* docs: v0.46.0 release notes, bump version, update test counts
---------
Co-authored-by: Nathan Esquenazi <nesquena@gmail.com>
2026-04-11 17:17:52 +00:00
|
|
|
# ── Credential redaction ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _build_redact_fn():
|
|
|
|
|
"""Return redact_sensitive_text from hermes-agent if available, else a fallback."""
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text
|
|
|
|
|
return redact_sensitive_text
|
|
|
|
|
except ImportError:
|
|
|
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Minimal fallback covering the most common credential prefixes
|
|
|
|
|
_CRED_RE = _re.compile(
|
|
|
|
|
r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])("
|
|
|
|
|
r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}" # OpenAI / Anthropic / OpenRouter
|
|
|
|
|
r"|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}" # GitHub PAT (classic)
|
|
|
|
|
r"|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{10,}" # GitHub PAT (fine-grained)
|
|
|
|
|
r"|gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}" # GitHub OAuth token
|
|
|
|
|
r"|ghu_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}" # GitHub user-to-server token
|
|
|
|
|
r"|ghs_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}" # GitHub server-to-server token
|
|
|
|
|
r"|ghr_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}" # GitHub refresh token
|
|
|
|
|
r"|AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}" # AWS Access Key ID
|
|
|
|
|
r"|xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}" # Slack tokens
|
|
|
|
|
r"|hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}" # HuggingFace token
|
|
|
|
|
r"|SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}" # SendGrid API key
|
|
|
|
|
r")(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
_AUTH_HDR_RE = _re.compile(r"(Authorization:\s*Bearer\s+)(\S+)", _re.IGNORECASE)
|
|
|
|
|
_ENV_RE = _re.compile(
|
|
|
|
|
r"([A-Z0-9_]{0,50}(?:API_?KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|AUTH)[A-Z0-9_]{0,50})"
|
|
|
|
|
r"\s*=\s*(['\"]?)(\S+)\2"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
_PRIVKEY_RE = _re.compile(
|
|
|
|
|
r"-----BEGIN[A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END[A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _mask(token: str) -> str:
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|
return f"{token[:6]}...{token[-4:]}" if len(token) >= 18 else "***"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _fallback_redact(text: str) -> str:
|
|
|
|
|
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
|
|
|
|
|
return text
|
|
|
|
|
text = _CRED_RE.sub(lambda m: _mask(m.group(1)), text)
|
|
|
|
|
text = _AUTH_HDR_RE.sub(lambda m: m.group(1) + _mask(m.group(2)), text)
|
|
|
|
|
text = _ENV_RE.sub(
|
|
|
|
|
lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}={m.group(2)}{_mask(m.group(3))}{m.group(2)}", text
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
text = _PRIVKEY_RE.sub("[REDACTED PRIVATE KEY]", text)
|
|
|
|
|
return text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return _fallback_redact
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
|
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|
|
_redact_text = _build_redact_fn()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _redact_value(v):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Recursively redact credentials from strings, dicts, and lists."""
|
|
|
|
|
if isinstance(v, str):
|
|
|
|
|
return _redact_text(v)
|
|
|
|
|
if isinstance(v, dict):
|
|
|
|
|
return {k: _redact_value(val) for k, val in v.items()}
|
|
|
|
|
if isinstance(v, list):
|
|
|
|
|
return [_redact_value(item) for item in v]
|
|
|
|
|
return v
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def redact_session_data(session_dict: dict) -> dict:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Redact credentials from message content and tool_call data before API response.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Applies to: messages[], tool_calls[], and title.
|
|
|
|
|
The underlying session file is not modified; redaction is response-layer only.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
result = dict(session_dict)
|
|
|
|
|
if isinstance(result.get('title'), str):
|
|
|
|
|
result['title'] = _redact_text(result['title'])
|
|
|
|
|
if 'messages' in result:
|
|
|
|
|
result['messages'] = _redact_value(result['messages'])
|
|
|
|
|
if 'tool_calls' in result:
|
|
|
|
|
result['tool_calls'] = _redact_value(result['tool_calls'])
|
|
|
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-04-05 06:30:20 +00:00
|
|
|
def read_body(handler) -> dict:
|
feat: Sprint 19 — password auth, security headers, login page
Auth system (off by default, zero friction for localhost):
- New api/auth.py module: password hashing (SHA-256 + STATE_DIR salt),
signed HMAC session cookies (24h TTL), auth middleware
- Enable via HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD env var or Settings panel
- Minimal dark-themed login page at /login (self-contained HTML)
- POST /api/auth/login, /api/auth/logout, GET /api/auth/status
- Settings panel: "Access Password" field + "Sign Out" button
- password_hash added to settings.json (null = auth disabled)
Security hardening:
- Security headers on all responses: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,
X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: same-origin
- POST body size limit: 20MB cap in read_body() to prevent DoS
Closes #23. 9 new tests. Total: 304 passed, 0 regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-03 12:53:26 +00:00
|
|
|
"""Read and JSON-parse a POST request body (capped at 20MB)."""
|
2026-03-31 03:40:19 +00:00
|
|
|
length = int(handler.headers.get('Content-Length', 0))
|
feat: Sprint 19 — password auth, security headers, login page
Auth system (off by default, zero friction for localhost):
- New api/auth.py module: password hashing (SHA-256 + STATE_DIR salt),
signed HMAC session cookies (24h TTL), auth middleware
- Enable via HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD env var or Settings panel
- Minimal dark-themed login page at /login (self-contained HTML)
- POST /api/auth/login, /api/auth/logout, GET /api/auth/status
- Settings panel: "Access Password" field + "Sign Out" button
- password_hash added to settings.json (null = auth disabled)
Security hardening:
- Security headers on all responses: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,
X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: same-origin
- POST body size limit: 20MB cap in read_body() to prevent DoS
Closes #23. 9 new tests. Total: 304 passed, 0 regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-03 12:53:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if length > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
|
|
|
|
|
raise ValueError(f'Request body too large ({length} bytes, max {MAX_BODY_BYTES})')
|
2026-03-31 03:40:19 +00:00
|
|
|
raw = handler.rfile.read(length) if length else b'{}'
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
return _json.loads(raw)
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
|
|
|
return {}
|